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Structured Abstract: 
 
Purpose – This paper aims to contribute to the ongoing debate on governance, accountability, transparency 
and corporate social responsibility (CSR) in the mining sector of a developing country context. It examines 
the reporting practices of the two largest transnational gold-mining companies in Tanzania in order to draw 
attention to the role played by local government regulations and advocacy and campaigning by nationally 
organised non-governmental organisations (NGOs) with respect to promoting corporate social 
reporting practices. 
 
Design/methodology/approach –The paper takes a political economy perspective to consider 
the serious implications of the neo-liberal ideologies of the global capitalist economy, as 
manifested in Tanzania’s regulatory framework and in NGO activism, for the corporate 
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disclosure, accountability and responsibility of transnational companies (TNCs). A qualitative field case 
study methodology is adopted to locate the largely unfamiliar issues of CSR in the Tanzanian mining sector 
within a more familiar literature on social accounting. Data for the case study were obtained from interviews 
and from analysis of documents such as annual reports, social responsibility reports, newspapers, NGO 
reports and other publicly available documents. 
 
Findings – Analysis of interviews, press clips and NGO reports draws attention to social and environmental 
problems in the Tanzanian mining sector, which are arguably linked to the manifestation of the broader crisis 
of neo-liberal agendas. While these issues have serious impacts on local populations in the mining areas, they 
often remain invisible in mining companies’ social disclosures. Increasing evidence of social and 
environmental ills raises serious questions about the effectiveness of the regulatory frameworks, as well as 
the roles played by NGOs and other pressure groups in Tanzania. 
 
Practical implications – By empowering local NGOs through educational, capacity-building, technological 
and other support, NGOs’ advocacy, campaigning and networking with other civil society groups can play a 
pivotal role in encouraging corporations, especially TNCs, to adopt more socially and environmentally 
responsible business practices and to adhere to international and local standards, which in turn may help to 
improve the lives of many poor people living in developing countries in general, and Tanzania in particular. 
 
Originality/value – This paper contributes insights from gold-mining activities in Tanzania to the existing 
literature on CSR in the mining sector. It also contributes to political economy theory by locating CSR 
reporting within the socio-political and regulatory context in which mining operations take place in Tanzania. 
It is argued that, for CSR reporting to be effective, robust regulations and enforcement and stronger political 
pressure must be put in place. 
 
Keywords: Corporate social responsibility; globalisation; neo-liberalism, transnational corporations; regulatory 
structures; non-government organisations (NGOs); Tanzania. 
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Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting in the Mining Sector of Tanzania:  
(Lack of) Government Regulatory Controls and NGO Activism 
Purpose – This paper aims to contribute to the ongoing debate on governance, 
accountability, transparency and corporate social responsibility (CSR) in the mining sector of 
a developing country context. It examines the reporting practices of the two largest 
transnational gold-mining companies in Tanzania in order to draw attention to the role played 
by local government regulations and advocacy and campaigning by nationally organised non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) with respect to promoting corporate social reporting 
practices. 
Design/methodology/approach – The paper takes a political economy perspective to 
consider the serious implications of the neo-liberal ideologies of the global capitalist 
economy, as manifested in Tanzania’s regulatory framework and in NGO activism, for the 
corporate disclosure, accountability and responsibility of transnational companies (TNCs). A 
qualitative field case study methodology is adopted to locate the largely unfamiliar issues of 
CSR in the Tanzanian mining sector within a more familiar literature on social accounting. 
Data for the case study were obtained from interviews and from analysis of documents such 
as annual reports, social responsibility reports, newspapers, NGO reports and other publicly 
available documents. 
Findings – Analysis of interviews, press clips and NGO reports draws attention to social and 
environmental problems in the Tanzanian mining sector, which are arguably linked to the 
manifestation of the broader crisis of neo-liberal agendas. While these issues have serious 
impacts on local populations in the mining areas, they often remain invisible in mining 
companies’ social disclosures. Increasing evidence of social and environmental ills raises 
serious questions about the effectiveness of the regulatory frameworks, as well as the roles 
played by NGOs and other pressure groups in Tanzania. 
Practical implications – By empowering local NGOs through educational, capacity-
building, technological and other support, NGOs’ advocacy, campaigning and networking 
with other civil society groups can play a pivotal role in encouraging corporations, especially 
TNCs, to adopt more socially and environmentally responsible business practices and to 
adhere to international and local standards, which in turn may help to improve the lives of 
many poor people living in developing countries in general, and Tanzania in particular. 
Originality/value – This paper contributes insights from gold-mining activities in Tanzania 
to the existing literature on CSR in the mining sector. It also contributes to political economy 
theory by locating CSR reporting within the socio-political and regulatory context in which 
mining operations take place in Tanzania. It is argued that, for CSR reporting to be effective, 
robust regulations and enforcement and stronger political pressure must be put in place. 
Keywords: Corporate social responsibility; globalisation; neo-liberalism, transnational 
corporations; regulatory controls; non-governmental organisations (NGOs); Tanzania. 
2 
Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting in the Tanzanian Mining Sector:  
(Lack of) Government Regulatory Controls and NGO Activism 
1. Introduction 
Recent years have witnessed a considerable increase in the variety and volume of 
literature on corporate social responsibility (CSR) (see e.g. Belal and Owen, 2007; Cooper 
and Owen, 2007; Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2007). This literature has emerged from a variety 
of disciplines, including sociology, philosophy, accounting, management, finance, law and 
politics (see Banerjee, 2007, 2008; Jones, 2008; Vogel, 2005). Within the accounting 
literature, CSR has been considered as part of social accounting, which overlaps with social 
and environmental accounting (Beck et al., 2010; Gray et al., 2001). CSR in this context is 
viewed as a potentially benign mechanism which may be used to mobilise meaningful 
organisational changes but may lead to less unethical and unsustainable business practices 
(see Dey, 2007, p. 424). However, notwithstanding the increasing attention being given to 
CSR in the literature as a postulate for accountability and for the promotion of ethical and 
responsible business practices, most studies have been primarily Western-centric (e.g. Gray et 
al., 2001; Guthrie and Parker, 1989, 1990). In developed countries, comprehensive 
environmental regulations are in place, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are 
relatively active in scrutinising corporate conduct, and labour unions campaign for workers’ 
rights (see Moon and Vogel, 2008; O’Donovan, 2002). These pressure groups arguably 
generate ‘invisible’ pressures that drive companies to adopt voluntary CSR reporting 
practices (see Hilson, 2012, p. 132). 
What, though, is the CSR story in a developing country such as Tanzania? Although, 
over the last decade, an increasing number of studies has focused on CSR issues in 
developing countries (e.g. Belal, 2008; Belal and Owen, 2007; Belal et al., 2015; Ite, 2004; 
Lauwo and Otusanya, 2014), little explicit attention has been paid to the role played by local 
laws and regulations and the activism of nationally organised NGOs in promoting 
transparency, accountability and responsible business practices. An increasingly rich 
collection of case studies in developing countries paints a very positive picture of CSR, 
mostly in Latin American, Asian and South African contexts (e.g. Belal, 2008; Islam and 
Dellaportas, 2011). The underlying assumption is that the standards implemented by 
transnational corporations (TNCs) in developed countries are also adopted in the developing 
countries in which they operate (Hilson, 2012). However, this assumption is problematic, 
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given that the pressures which supposedly induce TNCs to adopt voluntary CSR reporting 
practices in developed countries may not be present in many developing countries, such as 
Tanzania. While, in developed countries, CSR complements a set of robust regulations, in 
developing countries there inevitably tends to be poor enforcement of legislation and weaker 
pressure groups (see Banerjee, 2007, 2008). Yet, previous studies on social and 
environmental accounting have tended instead to focus on the impact of global issues, such as 
media pressure (e.g. Islam and Deegan, 2010; Brown and Deegan, 1991), the influence of 
international organisations such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the United Nations 
(see Belal, 2008), and the pressure of international NGOs such as Amnesty International, 
Corporate Watch and Christian Aid (see Tilt, 1994). 
It is in the above context that this study seeks to address the gap in the literature by 
problematising the extent to which local government regulatory controls and national NGO 
activism may influence the nature of corporate social disclosure in a developing country, 
namely Tanzania. The paper contributes to the debate on governance, transparency, 
accountability and CSR in the mining sector, a sector dominated by large TNCs that embrace 
strategies such as community initiatives as part of their commitment to social responsibility, 
but whose socio-economic and environmental impact is felt most strongly at the local level. 
The paper explores the reporting practices of the two largest transnational gold-mining 
companies in Tanzania. It draws on political economy theory in order to consider the role 
played by key actors (the government and NGOs) in mining activities in Tanzania. A number 
of accounting scholars (see McSweeney, 2009) have highlighted the importance of placing 
social research in a broader context. Thus, corporate social disclosure in Tanzania should not 
be examined in isolation from the broader global political economy, which shapes the local 
institutional structures responsible for promoting corporate accountability, transparency and 
responsibility. 
Increasing corporate wealth and power in an era of globalisation has led to rising 
concern by governments, NGOs and other pressure groups about the negative social impact 
of their activities (see Bakan, 2004). Given the expanding role of financial and capital 
markets and the rolling back of the state under global capitalism, NGOs are stepping in to 
address governance challenges in order to create equitable, just and democratic societies 
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(Kuropas, 1997; Mercer, 2002).1 Studies on CSR (e.g. Moon and Vogel, 2008; Neu et al., 
1998; O’Donovan, 2002; Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2007) have revealed increasing pressure 
from NGOs and other civil society groups, including academics, trade unions and the media, 
for corporations to act in socially and environmentally responsible ways. Over time, as 
NGOs’ advocacy and campaigning for corporate policy formulation has intensified, CSR 
disclosure has changed. It has been argued that NGO activism creates a ‘legitimacy gap’, 
which provides significant motivation for companies to engage, or attempt to engage, in 
responsible business practices in order to acquire or maintain legitimacy (Doh and Teegen, 
2004; Waddock, 2004). Thus, NGOs’ advocacy, campaigning and networking with media, 
local parties and other civil society groups have played a vital role in encouraging TNCs to 
adhere to international standards of performance with regard to the environment, labour 
conditions and human rights. However, as indigenous communities living in the poorer 
regions of the world (usually developing countries) continue to suffer severe social and 
environmental problems as a result of corporate activity (Banerjee, 2007), there is a clear 
need for debate about the extent to which NGO activism and other pressure group 
intervention can improve CSR practices. 
Similarly, laws and regulations have increasingly been enacted at both national level 
(particularly in developed countries) and international level in order to oblige companies to 
address ecological, employment, investment and gender issues, and other social problems 
caused by corporate activity (Buhr, 1998). One way in which major corporations have 
responded to increasing pressure to improve their social and environmental performance is by 
publishing CSR reports (see Banerjee, 2007; Vogel, 2005). As a result, CSR has gained 
greater prominence in the contemporary global economy. This goes hand in hand with a 
proliferation of discourses such as ‘ethics’, ‘shared values’ and ‘giving back’ to society.2 
However, it has been argued that, in a capitalist society, norms, standards and 
institutionalised values (such as those relating to CSR), which are sometimes codified in soft 
laws and regulations, are grounded in a neo-liberal ideology that facilitates wealth 
accumulation, private property rights and free trade policies (see Campbell, 2010). 
                                                 
1 NGOs have commonly been categorised into two groups: community-based organisations, which emerged in 
the post-war period between the 1950s and 1980s in response to the failure of post-colonial states to ensure the 
basic needs of the poor; and advocacy NGOs, which seek to raise public awareness of global policy issues 
shaping socio-economic and environmental aspects in society. 
2 However, as these are often subordinated to the pursuit of higher profits for shareholders, several scholars have 
described contemporary CSR practices as a new management tool and business strategy for legitimising 
corporate power (Bakan, 2004; Korten, 2001; O’Dwyer, 2003; Vogel, 2005). 
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It is therefore questionable as to how far the regulatory framework in a developing 
country such as Tanzania can successfully promote accountability, responsibility, 
transparency and corporate disclosure. Governments in these countries are often desperate to 
attract foreign investment in order to deal with their various socio-economic problems, 
particularly endemic poverty. Consequently, if neo-liberal types of institutional arrangement 
are proposed by potential international investors as requirements for the release of funds, then 
countries will mould their strategic plans accordingly. Thus, developing countries’ 
governments, in their attempts to secure and retain capital investment, face significant 
challenges as they seek to balance the interests of private capital and a desire to promote 
prosperity and social order (Harvey, 2005; Korten, 2001). Promoting adequate and 
responsible corporate social and environmental practices in developing countries also poses 
problems, as these are shaped by the particular historical, socio-cultural and regulatory 
structures that are inevitably embedded within the capitalist economic system. Thus, in the 
context of developing countries, it is necessary to understand the impact of these structures 
and power relations on CSR practices. 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the literature. 
Section 3 considers the political economy perspective of CSR practices, arguing that, in the 
contemporary global economy, government regulations and other institutional structures that 
have the potential to promote responsible business practices are embedded in power 
struggles, negotiation and compromise. Section 4 considers some of the socio-political, 
economic and historical issues that have shaped CSR practices in the Tanzanian context, and 
the role played by legal and regulatory frameworks and NGO activism in enabling or 
constraining various aspects of CSR practices. Section 5 presents a case study highlighting 
the nature of CSR reporting in the Tanzanian mining sector and its socio-cultural and 
regulatory context. This section also considers evidence of increasing social and 
environmental problems rarely disclosed in the CSR reports of mining companies, 
highlighting some weaknesses in governance structures in Tanzania, in particular the 
inadequacy and ineffectiveness of legal provisions, and failure on the part of both the 
government and NGOs to bring about much-needed reforms with regard to CSR practices. 
Section 6 provides a summary and conclusions. 
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2. Overview of the literature on CSR practices 
Despite CSR’s long history, it has become a much-debated topic in the contemporary 
era of globalisation (see Puxty, 1986; Spence, 2007, 2009; Tinker et al., 1991).  Parker (2005, 
p. 844) has described the literature on CSR as voluminous, disparate, diverse and exciting, 
but without a commonly agreed philosophical and methodological standpoint. In the 
accounting literature, CSR reporting has been considered as part of a wider system of societal 
governance that requires corporate responsibility to address and disclose issues such as 
accountability, ethics and sustainability, as well as socio-economic, ecological and 
humanitarian problems (Gray et al., 2001; Sikka, 2010). The literature indicates that 
increased awareness of socio-economic and environmental crises, corporate failures and 
collapses, and the recent financial crisis, have raised further questions about the regulation 
and morality of capitalism and the complexity of business-society relationships, leading to 
demands for enhanced corporate accountability and social responsibility (Bakan, 2004; 
Puxty, 1986; Tinker et al., 1991). Thus, making TNCs socially responsible and accountable 
has become a major issue in contemporary capitalist society (see Sikka, 2010; Spence, 2009). 
The case for CSR is far more contentious in developing countries, as their 
governments often face serious dilemmas in endeavouring to promote responsible business 
practices while at the same time attempting to attract foreign investment (see Korten, 2001; 
Offe, 1984; Strange, 1996).3 In this context, the pressure to embrace CSR is far greater in the 
extractive industries because the industrial-scale extraction of natural resources affects both 
the environment and local populations (Campbell, 2012; Fonseca, 2010). Extraction 
companies, and particularly mining companies, have been challenged over human rights 
violations, corruption scandals and tailings dam accidents, triggering the emergence of anti-
mining NGOs that have questioned the sector’s ability to behave sustainably (see Fonseca, 
2010; Garvin et al, 2009; Macintyre et al., 2008). As a result, global mining corporations 
have come under intense pressure and scrutiny from environmental agencies, NGOs, 
indigenous people and human rights movements that have formed in response to concerns 
about the social and environmental impacts of mining operations (see Banerjee, 2000; 
Christian Aid, 2008; Kapelus, 2002; UNCTAD, 2007). Of all sectors, mining arguably often 
                                                 
3 According to Visser (2008), developing countries are distinctive in this context: (1) they are some of the most 
rapidly expanding economies and therefore have the most lucrative growth markets for business; (2) they are 
locations in which social and environmental crises are most acutely felt; and (3) they are places where 
globalisation, investment and economic growth are likely to have the greatest social and environmental impacts. 
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causes the most significant irreversible damage to the natural environment and the local 
population (see Lauwo and Otusanya, 2014; Yakovleva, 2005). It has also been argued, for 
example by Mutti et al. (2012) and Lauwo and Otusanya (2014), that negative social and 
environmental impacts in the mining sector, including industrial accidents, environmental 
degradation, health and safety issues, impacts on the livelihoods of local communities and 
violations of human rights, manifest themselves to the extreme. In this context, Campbell 
(2012, p. 138) maintains that – contrary to an initial avowal that foreign investments were 
much needed in the mining sector, fully justifying the negative impacts that were to be 
mitigated by voluntary measures – there is increasing evidence of deplorable social and 
environmental impacts of mining activities in developing countries. In attempting to explain 
such disappointing impacts, recent research has tended to draw attention to the ‘governance 
gap’ linked to dysfunctional administrative and political processes within the governments of 
countries in which mining activities take place (see Campbell, 2010, 2012). Mining 
companies are increasingly being called to be accountable, transparent and socially 
responsible (Christian Aid, 2008; Corporate Watch, 2003). 
In response to increasing pressure, large transnational mining companies launched the 
Global Mining Initiative (GMI), one of the most comprehensive, sustainability-oriented 
efforts ever seen in the sector (Young, 2005).4 In undertaking CSR initiatives, more mining 
companies are also publishing stand-alone social and environmental reports and are adopting 
voluntary codes of conduct, such as Extractive Industry Transparency Initiatives (EITI), as a 
way of showing commitment to good governance, transparency, accountability and 
responsibility. Arguably, the intensity of the agenda and the number of policies and 
programmes in place have contributed to the CSR agenda becoming a business in its own 
right (Campbell, 2012). However, increasing evidence of the social and environmental impact 
of mining operations in developing countries (see Christian Aid, 2008) raises serious 
questions about the potential of CSR to promote socio-economic development and create a 
just and fair society (see Gallhofer and Haslam, 1997; Spence, 2007, 2009). Despite the 
initiatives and claims made by mining companies with respect to social responsibility, 
accountability and transparency, CSR reports remain silent about employee grievances, 
                                                 
4 At the core of the GMI was the Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development (MMSD) project, which 
gathered together 150 individuals and organisations to examine the role that the mining sector could play in 
sustainable development (Fonseca, 2010). 
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environmental pollution, local community conflicts and other social problems (see Banerjee, 
2000). The theoretical framework adopted in this paper is discussed in the next section. 
 
3. The mirror: Theoretical perspectives 
In order to understand the complexities associated with CSR reporting, scholars have 
adopted a range of theoretical frameworks, such as stakeholder, legitimacy, institutional and 
political economy frameworks, and these have provided some insight into both the social and 
environmental problems relating to corporate activities (Deegan and Gordon, 1996; Guthrie 
and Parker, 1989). Although stakeholder and legitimacy theories have often been used as 
theoretical frameworks for understanding CSR practices, the extent to which these theories 
can explain the contradictions and dilemmas faced by developing countries with respect to 
CSR practices has remained problematic. Thus, while such theories may provide useful 
frameworks for explaining and understanding business-society relationships, they pay little 
attention to the broader socio-political, economic, historical and power structures that shape 
CSR reporting practices (see Banerjee, 2007; Cooper and Scherer, 1984; Tinker et al., 1991). 
Banerjee (2007, p. 28), for example, has criticised these theoretical frameworks for ignoring 
the many social and economic conflicts that exist in different societies. For instance, from a 
legitimacy theory perspective, social and environmental disclosure is perceived as a strategy 
employed by corporate entities to gain society’s acceptance of and approval for their 
operations. However, this has become questionable, especially in developing countries where, 
despite the increasing social and environmental impact of corporate activities, companies 
continue to carry out these activities relatively unchallenged (see Banerjee, 2007). In order to 
understand CSR practices in a developing country such as Tanzania, it is necessary to adopt 
an appropriate methodological framework that takes into account the social, political and 
economic contexts in which business organisations conduct their activities (see Banerjee, 
2007; Kuasirikun and Sherer, 2004; Scherer and Palazzo, 2007; Tinker, 1980; Tinker et al., 
1991). The methodological framework adopted should be able to shed some light on the role 
played by local government regulations and nationally organised NGO activism in relation to 
the global economic and political processes that shape social relations, as discussed in the 
next section. 
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3.1 Political economy  perspective on CSR 
CSR as an embedded social accounting practice cannot easily be understood in 
isolation from the socio-political, economic and historical dynamics of a society as a whole. 
This paper argues that analysis of these social forces is essential for a better understanding of 
the nature of CSR discourse. The paper adopts a political economy approach in order to 
consider the local and global institutional and power structures that shape, modify and 
influence the construction and (re)production of CSR practices in a developing country such 
as Tanzania. Studies in the field of political economy have revealed a dramatic 
transformation in human societies and accounting practices across the world, particularly in 
the contemporary global economy (Harvey, 2005). Political economy has been defined as the 
social, political and economic arrangements affecting global systems of production, exchange 
and distribution and the social practices reflected therein (Strange, 1996, p. 18). A political 
economy approach considers the role of economic dependence and power relations on a 
discourse. It emphasises interrelationships between socio-political and economic forces in 
society, and recognises the effects of the accounting function on the distribution of income, 
power and wealth (Cooper and Sherer, 1984). From a political economy perspective, 
accounting systems, of which CSR is a part, act to ‘create, distribute and mystify power 
relations’ (Buhr, 1998, p. 165). As Tinker (1980) has argued: 
Political economy relies on the social relations of production: an analysis of the 
division of power between interest groups in the society and the institutional 
processes through which interests may be advanced (p.148). 
According to Tinker et al. (199), CSR reporting can be considered to be a reflection 
of power relations and social conflicts occurring between capital and other social groups (e.g. 
environmentalists, workers, consumers, women, minorities (pp. 46-47). Guthrie and Parker 
(1990) suggest that a political economy theory of social disclosure may improve our 
understanding of CSR practices: 
[A] political economy theory of social disclosure is both viable and may 
contribute toward our understanding of observed developments in national 
reporting practices. Corporate social disclosures have appeared to reflect public 
social priorities, respond to government pressure, accommodate environmental 
pressures and sectional interests, and protect corporate prerogatives and 
projected corporate images (pp. 172-3). 
From a political economy perspective, contemporary CSR can be regarded as being 
driven by changes in socio-political and economic pressures in the contemporary era of 
economic globalisation, such as, for instance, the escalation of neo-liberalism and its 
10 
associated technological advances in the 1980s and 1990s (see Tilt, 1994). Although, in 
theory, neo-liberalism advocates privatisation, free markets, deregulation and withdrawal of 
the state as a way of promoting social economic development, neo-liberal policies have 
arguably had serious implications for the social wellbeing of many countries, especially 
developing ones, where social inequalities and concentrations of wealth and power have 
increased (see Harvey, 2005; Hoogvelt, 2001; Korten, 2001). 
 
3.1.1 Globalisation, neo-liberalism and the role of the state 
In the contemporary era of globalisation, the triumph of neo-liberalism has produced 
substantial changes in the structure of societies, which has created significant challenges with 
regard to the nature and form of CSR practices (e.g. Held and McGrew, 2002), particularly in 
developing countries (Hoogvelt, 2001). Market liberalism has expanded the global network 
of TNCs while signalling a vindication of the liberal position of the state and civil society 
(Bakan, 2004; Hulme and Edwards, 1997; Korten, 2001). Neo-liberalism in this context is 
viewed as an ideological hegemonic project, in which political and economic dominance is 
secured through the exercise of class power. In the global economy, TNCs have become 
dominant and powerful institutions, with the largest among them reaching into virtually every 
country of the world, and sometimes even exceeding governments in size and power (Bakan, 
2004; Korten, 2001). According to Harvey (2007, p. 23), neo-liberalism has swept across the 
world like a vast tidal wave of institutional reform and discursive adjustment, a consequence 
of a whole generation of sophisticated class struggle on the part of the upper strata to restore 
class dominance. As a result of neo-liberal policies, free trade agreements have been 
established between nations, and capital movement facilitated across borders. These 
developments have arguably exposed workers and society at large to a much less stable 
working environment embedded within a market-oriented corporate governance model 
(Munck, 2005). Consequently, the degree of inequality between the privileged minority and 
the impoverished majority – most of the latter being located in developing countries – has 
intensified considerably in the contemporary capitalist economy (Harris and Seid, 2000). 
From a broader political economy perspective, proponents of neo-liberalism purport 
that social welfare can be advanced by invigorating capitalist freedoms and skills within an 
institutional framework characterised by strong property rights, free markets and free trade 
(Harvey, 2005, p. 2). In this context, the role of the state is to set up the legal structures and 
functions required to secure private property rights and to guarantee the proper functioning of 
markets. However, it has been argued that global economic competition and neo-liberal logic 
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may lead to a race to the bottom, as TNCs seek out countries with lax human rights, labour 
and environmental standards (Smith et al., 1999). Although the role of the state has always 
been a matter of debate (e.g. Strange, 1996), in capitalist societies it is the task of the state to 
establish the preconditions for the proper working of the markets, i.e. to re-define legal 
systems, to provide public goods, and to reduce the consequences of externalities (Scherer 
and Palazzo, 2008, p. 1). Yet, the state’s accomplishment of this task remains questionable, as 
neo-liberal agendas continue to advance policies such as deregulation – which engineer the 
removal of state regulatory controls that intervene in the markets – while at the same time 
reconstructing new forms of regulation that facilitate freedom of markets (Harvey, 2005, 
2007). 
Thus, it appears that the focus on capital as the engine for growth has shifted attention 
from social welfare to economic growth, without questioning whether such growth will 
necessarily promote a fair, equitable and just society. Although strong governments may be 
able to challenge corporate conduct and deal with externalities and business consequences, 
the ability of governments in developing countries to address the adverse socio-economic and 
environmental impact of contemporary capitalism is severely constrained (Harvey, 2005; 
Sikka, 2010). As a result of the pressing need to stimulate their economies and reduce 
poverty, governments in developing countries have increasingly turned to TNCs to provide 
investment, create employment, increase government revenues and promote economic 
development. In order to attract investment, they have often applied less stringent regulations 
and have also offered investment incentives, subsidies, investment protection, guarantees and 
stabilisation clauses (Cox, 1996; Lobel, 2006).5 Although these strategies have increased the 
inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) and the growth of TNC operations in such 
countries, they have inevitably often compromised the capacity of governments to make and 
enforce laws and regulations that promote accountability and protect employees, local 
communities and the environment. In essence, the legal and regulatory frameworks, such as 
those governing the environment, employment and taxation, and the economic policies of 
developing countries may instead be drawn up with the primary aim of facilitating the 
mobility of capital (Hoogvelt, 2001). 
                                                 
5 These are contractual clauses in foreign investment agreements with developing countries that guarantee to 
foreign investors that the terms agreed, including the fiscal and regulatory regime, will remain unchanged over 
the life of the project. 
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Thus, a government regulatory framework embedded in neo-liberal ideology has 
become the main political arrangement, born out of power relations and struggles (see 
Campbell, 2010, p. 67). The spread of neo-liberal policies has indeed led to a surge in the 
hegemony of capital over labour and other social capital across the world. More specifically, 
the role and power of the state in the developing-country context has arguably been 
influenced and watered down by the state’s desire to attract and retain international capital 
and investment. Consequently, social accounting practices in such countries tend to be poorly 
controlled and regulated. In the absence of global governance structures to ensure that 
corporations are accountable, responsible and transparent, NGOs have stepped in to fill the 
regulatory vacuum, but the impact of such bodies in developing countries remains debatable. 
 
3.1.2 The political economy of NGOs 
The proliferation of neo-liberal policies, which emphasise the merits of free markets, 
deregulation and privatisation, and the corresponding growth in corporate power have 
prompted many NGOs to shift attention to corporate actors (Sklair, 2002). This section 
considers the political economy perspective of NGOs as a broad framework that allows 
various factors to be taken into account, such as the historical, socio-cultural and regulatory 
structures and power relations that shape the extent to which NGOs can be effective in 
promoting corporate accountability, responsibility and transparency. It is argued that NGO 
activism can be regarded as being embedded within the neo-liberal global political economy 
and is shaped by power relations within this ideological context. 
In recent years there has been an upsurge in the number of NGOs interested in 
addressing issues such as (the lack of) corporate disclosure, transparency, human rights, 
grassroots development, humanitarian relief, environmental protection, conflict resolution 
and democratisation (DeMars, 2005).6 However, the dynamics of NGO activism and its 
relationship with wider social, economic and political contexts pose a serious question about 
the role of NGOs in promoting corporate social disclosure, especially in a developing country 
context (see Igoe and Kelsall, 2005; Lewis and Opoku-Mensah, 2006). 
                                                 
6 Although, NGOs are often presumed to be concerned with activities such as development, humanitarian work, 
the environment and human rights, this study takes a broader perspective, in which NGOs’ activities are 
considered to go beyond standard operational and advocacy activities to include others such as promoting 
disclosure, maintenance of communication systems, provision of information, sustaining shared values or a 
common identity, protecting collective interests, empowerment of the disadvantaged, and broadening the social 
debate on civil rights, human rights, ecological issues, accountability and transparency (also see Willetts, 2011). 
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In general, NGOs are bodies that seek to represent the interests of marginalised social 
groups or discourses within the wider public arena, to campaign on their behalf and thereby 
influence public policy (Mercer, 2002). According to the World Bank (2000, p. 44), 
‘increasing pressure from NGOs may serve to reduce the scope for autonomous government 
action, question corporate power, encourage wider monitoring and call attention to the need 
for policies to address socio-economic and environmental issues’. In recent years, global and 
local NGOs have dramatically increased in number and influence, particularly in developing 
countries (see Igoe and Kelsall, 2005; Michael, 2004).7 NGOs have emerged as distinct actors 
within the international political economy, actively questioning unequal power relations and 
corporate accountability, and campaigning for democracy and good governance (see Mercer, 
2002). Tvedt (1998) states that NGOs are playing a significant new role as central actors 
within an international social system of power, and are influencing governments and business 
organisations in both developed and developing countries. This is because they occupy a 
space separate from the market and the state. 
Over the past ten years or so, NGOs have played significant roles in campaigning for 
greater environmental protection and raising awareness of the impact of corporate activities 
on the environment and local communities (see Fombrun, 2006). They have been 
conspicuous in campaigning for increased corporate social disclosure, accountability and 
environmental transparency. They have often worked collectively to challenge unequal power 
relations when TNCs undertake major investments in developing countries. In so doing, they 
have apparently succeeded in creating new spaces, pressures and dialogues around business 
activities (Waddock, 2004). 
NGOs have brought to wider attention issues such as human rights abuses, corruption, 
pollution and environmental degradation, and other unethical corporate practices that have 
been masked within corporate disclosure (Waddock, 2008). NGO activism and campaigning 
have therefore significantly impacted the level of corporate social disclosure in the global 
economy (see Klein, 2000). For example, bodies including the Tax Justice Network, 
Corporate Watch, Amnesty International and Christian Aid have been working closely with 
other civil society organisations with similar interests to address the concerns of the most 
                                                 
7This includes organisations such as Global Witness, Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, Amnesty International, 
Human Rights Watch, Corporate Watch and Christian Aid. In developing countries, NGOs include 
philanthropic foundations, church development agencies, academic think-tanks and other organisations focusing 
on issues such as human rights, gender, health, social welfare, the environment and indigenous people (Clark, 
1998b). 
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disadvantaged and marginalised societal groups and to demand enhanced corporate social 
disclosure, transparency and accountability.8 Several international NGOs, including Friends 
of the Earth, have been working assiduously to construct ‘counter-accounts’ that question the 
conventional accounts (both financial and narrative) that corporations publish to explain their 
activities. In this way, otherwise marginalised voices and discourses have been given 
visibility.9 In order to contend with corporate reporting discrepancies, the Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI) has provided a common reporting framework for sustainability that allows 
cross-company and cross-industry comparisons (Waddock, 2008). Country-by-country (CbC) 
reporting is a new system of reporting, initially developed in 2009 by the Task Force on 
Financial Integrity and Economic Development (a coalition of NGOs), that calls on TNCs to 
disclose information on matters such as tax, population and workforce impacts and 
accountability processes as an integral way of promoting effective CSR and transparency in 
each country in which they operate.10 NGO initiatives on CbC reporting have recently 
received the support of members of the European Parliament (MEPs) and Labour Party MPs 
in the UK. As a result, there is now pressure from the European Union to require large 
companies to disclose on a CbC basis, for example the taxes they pay and the profits they 
make (Brunsden, 2013), and corporations are increasingly disclosing more information 
relating to policies and strategies on social, economic and environmental performance in 
response to increasing NGO pressure. 
Despite the NGOs’ pivotal global role in representing marginalised people and 
discourses, broadening the social debate and creating visibility for silenced social issues, their 
role in promoting corporate social disclosure in a developing country context has been a 
matter for debate amongst scholars (see Pinkney, 2007; Shivji, 2007; Ward, 2007). This is 
because local NGOs’ efforts in developing countries have arguably been undermined by their 
                                                 
8 This is the culmination of a process that began in the 1990s, with the sudden increase of NGO activism and 
engagement with corporations on issues such as child labour, sweatshops, human rights, sustainable 
development, oil pollution and tropical deforestation. Other anti-corporate campaigns organised by NGOs 
include the International Baby Food Action Network (IBFAN), those against Shell over the Brent Spar North 
Sea Oil Platform, the demands of the Ogoni people in Nigeria, those against Nike over child labour, and The 
Gap for working conditions in suppliers’ factories. 
9 Since 2002, Friends of the Earth have been producing an annual ‘Other Shell Report’ that documents Shell’s 
social and environmental impacts in various contexts. The ‘Other Shell Reports’ (2002, 2004, 2005, 2006) 
engage the voices of communities affected by Shell around the world in order to highlight the company’s poor 
CSR practices and outline where Shell is failing to comply with guidelines and international human rights laws. 
Friends of the Earth produce anti-accounts on other organisations as well, including Anglo Gold America, 
Barclays and BP. These reports tell somewhat different stories from those portrayed in CSR reports (see also 
Christian Aid, 2005). 
10 http://www.financialtransparency.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/06/Final_CbyC_Report_Published.pdf. 
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continuing reliance on external funding, mostly from Western donors and even from the 
corporate sector (see Hulme and Edwards, 1997). As a result, their capacity to campaign 
against increasing corporate power and the associated socio-economic and environmental 
consequences for local citizens is questionable. It has been argued that, as nationally 
organised NGOs depend on external funding, the resources they receive come bundled with 
particular rules and ideas regarding how they must be governed, and how they can contribute 
to the governing of others (see Ward, 2007). This bundling may have caused them to become 
increasingly subject to the dominant ideas and rules attached to development finance, in 
particular ideas relating to neo-liberalism (see Townsend et al., 2002). Thus, from a political 
economy perspective, capitalist forces are seen to be engaging in an alliance-building process 
with local NGOs in an effort to realign the ideology and material base of the dominant 
hegemonic order (Townsend et al., 2002; Ward, 2007). As Shivji (2007) has posited: 
Taking for granted the fundamentals of neoliberalism and financial capitalism, 
or challenging them only piecemeal on specific issues (for example debt, 
environmental or gender discrimination) actually draws the NGOs as 
protagonists into the global capitalism system (p. 37). 
This suggests that NGOs’ activism, especially in developing countries, is embedded 
in the neo-liberal crisis and the global capitalist system. Moreover, given increasing poverty 
levels, most local NGOs in developing countries have developed as grassroots organisations, 
seeking to step in and address pressing socio-economic needs and endemic poverty (Clarke, 
1998; Pinkney, 2009). As Pinkney (2009) has argued: 
In countries with weak states there may be charities to relieve poverty and 
suffering, often externally based and administered; and there may be informal 
self -help groups in the absence of any public provider of basic services (p.50). 
Therefore, given the persistence of poverty and the current socio-economic position of 
most developing countries in the global economy within which local NGOs are necessarily 
embedded, their role in demanding increased corporate disclosure and accountability is 
particularly complex. 
 
3.2 Research methodology and methods 
Researching the dynamics of CSR reporting in a developing country context requires 
an appropriate approach that both reflects the mix of rhetoric and realism in such reports, and 
locates this kind of reporting discourse in the wider historical, socio-political and economic 
environment within which it is embedded. A qualitative field case study methodology (Berry 
and Otley, 2004) was adopted in this research as we sought to articulate and locate the largely 
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unfamiliar issues within the more familiar literature of social accounting, and CSR in 
particular.11 Berry and Otley (2004) stress that case-based research is suitable for providing 
an understanding of the content, processes and context of a practice (such as CSR). Thus, in 
framing and addressing our research objectives, this paper is based on a triangulation of a 
literature review and fieldwork conducted from April to August 2008 in Tanzania to 
investigate the nature of CSR reporting within the Tanzanian context.12 The theoretical 
insights discussed in the previous section will be used to structure analysis of the empirical 
evidence and construct a theoretically informed analysis. Drawing on a political economy 
perspective, the paper presents an exploratory case study of the two largest transnational 
mining companies (Barrick Gold Corporation and AngloGold Ashanti Limited) that sought to 
gain a richer understanding of the context in which CSR takes place and how mining 
companies discharge their social obligations through their social disclosures. 
The data for the case study were obtained from interviews and document analysis, 
including archival records, annual reports, social responsibility reports, information from 
corporate websites, newspaper clips and any other publicly available social information. 
Negotiating access to the mining site was very problematic because of the confidentiality and 
secrecy guaranteed under the terms of mineral development agreements, and because of the 
increasing public and media attention being paid to the impact of mining activities in 
Tanzania. Owing to the access problems and confidentiality issues, semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with only eleven stakeholders: four employee representatives, two 
local community leaders, four local community members, and one NGO representative from 
the active NGO, Lawyers’ Environmental Action Team (LEAT).13 These interviews were 
used to solicit respondents’ views on CSR, which were then compared with corporate claims 
on CSR. An interview protocol was designed to encourage interviewees to participate in a 
loosely guided conversation to facilitate the emergence of different themes (see O’Dwyer, 
                                                 
11 Case studies allow for the investigation of a contemporary phenomenon in a context in which the boundaries 
between the phenomenon and the context are blurred and multiple sources of evidence are employed (Yin, 
2003). 
12 The fieldwork helped to illuminate the spread, significance and challenges faced by local NGOs, as a 
countervailing initiative to promote responsible practices in Tanzania. The literature review drew attention to the 
significance of NGOs’ actions for the development of CSR reporting within the international capitalist socio-
economic system. To understand what NGOs do and their interplay in CSR within the Tanzanian socio-political 
and regulatory context, it was necessary to reconsider the fieldwork data in a new frame. 
13 The interviews were conducted in person by the researcher at each interviewee’s business premises in 
Tanzania, and lasted on average one to one-and-a-half hours. LEAT, established in 1994, is an active NGO in 
Tanzania with a mission to ensure sound natural resource management and environmental protection in 
Tanzania. 
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Unerman and Bradley, 2005). The data collected from the interviews and document analysis 
were systematically transcribed and thematically analysed. Reflections were made on the 
collected data during ongoing scrutiny pre- and post-writing of the paper in order to gain a 
broader understanding of the CSR context. Analysis of interviews, press clips, NGO reports 
and previous literature on the subject area drew attention to the need to demystify the serious 
social and environmental issues that are arguably pervasive in mining areas. While these 
issues have serious impacts on the local populations of the mining areas, they often remain 
invisible in mining companies’ social disclosures. 
 
4. The Tanzanian socio-political and economic context 
Like many other developing countries, Tanzania has had to integrate its economic 
system into the contemporary global capitalist system. However, as a peripheral state, 
Tanzania needs capital, technology, skilled labour and financial resources and, like other 
developing countries, it has had to open its economy to TNCs (see Harris and Seid, 2000; 
Hoogvelt, 2001). Neo-liberal policies, implemented as a way of opening up the economy, 
have had serious implications for the Tanzanian government’s ability to promote CSR 
practices. This section considers the socio-political and economic environment of Tanzania as 
a background for understanding CSR reporting practices in the gold-mining industry. 
As is the case in other post-colonial and many other developing countries, Tanzania’s 
socio-political, economic and institutional structures have continued to be shaped by its 
historical development and its recent integration into the global capitalist economic system. 
Tanzania has also continued to experience considerable economic challenges, which have 
acted as a thrust for major policy and institutional changes (Lauwo and Otusanya, 2014). For 
many years it has been one of the poorest countries in the world, with many of its people 
living below the world poverty level (UNDP, 2013). In order to address its endemic poverty 
Tanzania has, over the years, introduced a number of institutional reforms. For instance, in 
1967, the government attempted to bring the economic sector and the political sphere under 
the control of the state through nationalisation policies (Tsikata, 2001). However, lack of 
public accountability, plus the huge amount of discretion and monopoly control afforded to 
those in power, skewed the benefits in favour of the political elite rather than the intended 
societal beneficiaries (Bagwacha et al., 1992). In fact, the Tanzanian government failed to 
create adequate policies and institutional structures to promote public accountability, 
responsibility and transparency in state-owned enterprises (Bagwacha et al., 1992). As a 
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result, various anti-social practices, such as corruption, embezzlement and nepotism, became 
endemic among the economic and political elite in Tanzania, leaving the country with severe 
and widespread poverty (Heilman and Ndumbaro, 2002). 
To further address the governance problems and widespread poverty, in 1985 the 
Tanzanian government adopted the structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) and 
liberalisation policies of the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
The SAPs required the Tanzanian government to introduce political and legislative reforms, 
remove state controls, and implement free trade and other neo-liberal policies in order to 
attract an inflow of foreign investment and TNC operations. Following the liberalisation of 
the Tanzanian economy, a number of multilateral and bilateral agreements were entered into, 
mostly in lucrative sectors of the economy, such as mineral and oil extraction, manufacturing 
and tourism (SID, 2009). To attract FDI, the Tanzanian government adopted a favourable 
investment environment for TNCs, for example by providing tax holidays, subsidies, 
substantial investment incentives and low taxes, and imposing minimal obligations on TNCs 
with respect to the workforce and the environment. These strategies led to an increased 
inflow of FDI, from US$12 million in 1992 to US$744 million in 2008 (World Bank, 2010). 
Nevertheless, Tanzania has remained overwhelmingly poor, with stagnant economic 
growth and deteriorating social services (World Bank, 2010). In 2012, 67.9 per cent of its 
population was living below the poverty line of US$1.25 per day (see UNDP, 2013). 
Moreover, the infant mortality rate remains relatively high, at 50 deaths per 1,000 babies born 
in 2010 and 76 under-five deaths per 1,000 born in 2010 (UNDP, 2013). According to the 
UNDP (2013), the average life expectancy was 58.9 years in 2012. In addition, the Human 
Development Index (HDI) remains very low, at 0.476, giving the country a ranking of 152 in 
the list of the 186 poorest countries in the world in 2012 (UNDP, 2013). 
Consequently, the economy has remained overwhelmingly dependent on donor 
agencies and foreign investment, especially for employment and government revenues (IMF, 
2007).14 Arguably, as contracts signed with foreign companies often cherry pick the most 
profitable sector of the economy, this has given TNCs greater corporate clout to demand 
                                                 
14 By the end of December 2007, Tanzania had an external debt of US$5.311 billion (IMF, 2007), which has had 
a negative impact on the economy (due to various attached conditionalities) and has continued to restrict the 
Tanzanian government’s efforts to alleviate poverty and create an adequate legal and regulatory framework to 
promote responsible business practices. Domestic debt increased from US$1.43 billion to US$1.67 billion 
between December 2006 and December 2007. 
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further favourable investment conditions, and has also resulted in their social responsibility 
reporting practices being insufficiently controlled (see Oxfam, 2008). In fact, the Tanzanian 
government’s reliance on TNC activity to stimulate socio-economic development has posed, 
and continues to pose, serious questions about the boundary between the state and 
corporations and about how to make TNCs accountable, responsible and transparent. As a 
result, the institutional and social structures of Tanzania have become subject to requirements 
for international capital investment, which arguably limit the chances of advancing good 
governance and CSR. Thus, although CSR disclosure can be encouraged, promoted and 
enforced by an appropriate regulatory framework, the Tanzanian government has found it 
difficult to control corporate conduct, as it is constantly under pressure to attract and retain 
foreign capital. The next section considers the legal and regulatory framework of Tanzania 
with respect to CSR practices. 
 
4.1 The legal and regulatory framework in Tanzania and CSR practices 
Maintenance of ethical business practices, public accountability, transparency and 
good governance have been the cornerstone of Tanzania since its independence in 1961 
(Killian, 2006; Oxfam, 2008). In order to achieve the above objectives and foster good CSR 
practices, successive governments have attempted to pass new laws and regulations (Shivji, 
1975). However, as post-independence codes of conduct have retained most features of the 
codes of the former colonial regime, Tanzania’s ability to promote CSR reporting and to 
protect the public interest has remained limited (see Shivji, 1976).15 For example, the 
Companies Act 1932–CAP 212 (as amended), which was enacted in 1929 during the British 
colonial period and which laid down requirements for addressing governance issues in the 
colonial government, remained in force for many years post-independence and was not 
amended until 2002. Although the Companies Act of 1932 required directors to improve 
corporate disclosure and to act in good faith to promote the best interests of the company (see 
section 185), the financial interests of shareholders have continued to prevail and often 
undermine the attention paid to other stakeholders’ issues. 
In 1967, President Nyerere’s government enacted new codes of conduct, enshrined in 
the 1967 Arusha Declaration, with the aim of promoting socio-economic development, public 
                                                 
15 While colonial codes of conduct were created to deepen the colonial interest of wealth accumulation, their 
pertinence in addressing post-independence socio-political and economic issues in Tanzania, and CSR practices 
in particular, is questionable (Shivji, 1975). 
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accountability, responsibility, good governance and corporate responsibility.16 However, 
despite the rhetoric of the Arusha Declaration, the reality for Tanzanian citizens left much to 
be desired, and laws and regulations continued to promote rent-seeking practices among the 
elite at the expense of the needs of wider society (Killian, 2006). This constrained the 
possibility of promoting corporate disclosure, public accountability and good governance 
(Fischer, 2006). 
In the 1990s, major legislative reforms were implemented by the Tanzanian 
government in order to integrate its economy into the global market. This led to a 
proliferation of new laws and regulations that contained, inter alia, provisions requiring 
public accountability, responsibility, transparency and enhanced corporate disclosure. They 
also sought to address and promote issues of environmental protection and management. For 
example, in 1997, in line with Agenda 21 of the Rio Declaration (which required a cross-
sector integration of policies, plans and programmes for effective management of the 
environment), the National Environment Policy (NEP) 1997 was introduced in Tanzania. 
NEP 1997 required companies to ensure the sustainable and equitable use of resources 
without degrading the environment or risking health and safety. Nevertheless, concerns have 
been raised that companies may not be adhering to it, especially in the mining sector (see 
Lauwo and Otusanya, 2014). 
Several regulations have been enacted in Tanzania to impose obligations on 
companies to address environmental issues. The global environmental concerns of the UN 
Conference on the Environment and Development (UNCED), expressed at the Earth Summit 
in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 and reaffirmed in Johannesburg in 2002, prompted some of these 
law reforms. Thus, in 2002, the Tanzanian government enacted Environmental Management 
(EM) Act No. 20 of 2004 to replace the National Environment Management Council 
(NEMC) Act of 1983. EM Act 2004 requires companies, before commencing operations in 
Tanzania, to submit an environmental impact assessment together with an environmental 
management plan. However, contrary to the legal requirements on environmental protection 
and management, pollution and environmental degradation have reportedly increased in the 
mining areas (see Mnyanyika, 2009; Shekighenda, 2009; Guardian on Sunday, 2011), 
                                                 
16 The Arusha Declaration was pronounced by President Julius Nyerere on 5 February 1967. Outlining the 
principles of Ujamaa, Nyerere’s vision of socialism sought to bring the economic and political spheres under 
state control (Tsikata, 2001). 
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denying the local community their right to a clean and safe environment (see Bitala, 2008; 
Bitala et al., 2009; Kitula, 2006). 
Furthermore, in an attempt to address local and global pressures and improve 
corporate governance, the Tanzanian government enacted the Companies Act 2002 (CA 
2002), amending that of 1932. CA 2002 made important changes to Tanzanian company law 
in order to incorporate global developments with regard to accounting disclosure. For 
example, section 151 of the Act requires companies to prepare books of accounts in order to 
disclose and explain their financial transactions. Section 183(1) articulates ‘matters which the 
directors of the company must have regard to in the performance of their functions, which 
include having regard to the interests of the members, the interests of the company’s 
employees’. Although the Act requires companies to disclose accounting information and 
consider the interests of other stakeholders, not just shareholders, stakeholder interests are 
often subordinated to the pursuit of shareholder interests. 
In response to the requirements of the ILO and the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR) with regard to employee working conditions, the Tanzanian government 
enacted the Employment and Labour Relations Act 2004 and the Labour Institutions Act 
2004 (which came into force in 2007 and 2006 respectively). Furthermore, in response to ILO 
requirements regarding the importance of improving health and safety in the workplace and 
reducing workplace injuries and accidents, the government enacted the Occupational Health 
and Safety Act 2003 and the Workers’ Compensation Act 2008. These Acts contain 
provisions requiring companies to improve workplace conditions and to protect employees 
against hazards to health and safety arising out of, or in connection with, activities at work. 
However, despite these provisions, the much expected improvements in the workplace 
environment in Tanzania have failed to materialise. 
Therefore, although several laws and regulations have been enacted in Tanzania to 
impose obligations on companies with respect to a variety of environmental and social issues, 
the ability of the Tanzanian government to implement some of the laws promoting corporate 
social disclosure has remained questionable. As a result, NGOs and other pressure groups 
(including academia and the media) have expressed concern about the regulatory gaps in 
Tanzania (see e.g. Christian Aid, 2005, 2008; Oxfam, 2008). The role of NGOs with regard 
to CSR practices in Tanzania is considered next. 
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4.2 NGOs and CSR in Tanzania 
The work of NGOs and other independent pressure groups is crucial in promoting 
corporate disclosure, transparency and public accountability. NGOs have sought to step into 
the regulatory gap created by the inadequacy of both national governments and international 
institutions in demanding social and environmental accounting and improved public 
accountability (Moon and Vogel, 2008). NGOs have been playing an increasingly significant 
role globally in challenging government policies and the activities of corporations with regard 
to abuses of human rights, environmental degradation and social unrest (see Mercer, 2000). 
In Tanzania, the rise of NGO activism dates back to the colonial period, when a 
number of organisations mobilised campaigns against colonial exploitative practices and 
demanded respect for human rights and public accountability (Shivji, 2004). However, 
colonial government policies and regulations (such as the Societies Ordinance, 1954) 
constrained NGO activism and NGO involvement in scrutinising government policies (Shivji, 
1980). During the post-independence period, successive governments embraced the colonial 
legal regime, undermining NGOs’ freedom of association and freedom of expression (Shivji, 
1976). The Arusha Declaration of 1967, in particular, restricted the independence of NGOs 
and their role in the promotion of public and corporate accountability, enhanced corporate 
disclosure and good governance. As a result, the activities of the few registered NGOs 
remained under strict government control, and their ability to campaign against government 
policies and to address democratic governance, enhanced disclosure and humanitarian and 
ecological problems was severely constrained. 
In the 1980s and 1990s, local and global pressures to liberalise the political and 
economic spheres in order to reduce the role of the state and improve democratic governance 
led to an increasing number of NGOs being established in Tanzania (Lange et al., 2000). 
NGO activism in this context expanded to include local, national and international 
development organisations, such as Oxfam, the Norwegian Church, and Christian Aid (Lange 
et al., 2000). According to Kelsall (2001, p. 140), there were approximately 8,000 local and 
international NGOs in Tanzania at this time, dealing with a range of activities, such as gender 
issues, human rights, the environment, advocacy and participatory development. In fact, 
NGOs have emerged as important social actors working closely with other civil society 
organisations to promote democratic governance, responsible corporate practice and the 
protection of human rights, and to support the government in providing social services 
(Lange et al., 2000). NGOs have often urged the Tanzanian government to introduce reforms 
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to address issues such as abuses of human rights, community unrest, pollution and 
environmental degradation (Curtis and Lissu, 2008; Lissu, 1999). However, owing to the 
level and scale of poverty in Tanzania, many NGOs have chosen to focus more on social 
service delivery and poverty reduction (Shivji, 2004). Shivji has argued that Tanzanian NGOs 
are represented mainly by donors who claim to have an interest in poverty eradication and the 
promotion of good governance. According to Shivji (2004), NGO activities may let the 
government ‘off the hook’ by facilitating the legitimation of Western neo-liberal policies: 
Using the name ‘promoting good governance’, they facilitate the legitimation 
of the neo-liberal policies of hegemonic Western powers and the international 
financial institutions (IFIs) applied in developing countries. Thus, by 
pretending to be partners in policy making, these NGOs let the government off 
the hook as it abdicates its own primary interest (pp. 690-99). 
Thus, relatively few local NGOs in Tanzania have been actively involved in 
advocating CSR practices (Shivji, 2004; Lissu, 1999).17 Although increasing numbers of 
international NGOs (such as Christian Aid, Amnesty International, Corporate Watch, Mining 
Watch and Friends of the Earth) are playing an important role in promoting social disclosure 
and CSR at the global level, Tanzanian NGOs have not been sufficiently strong and active to 
mobilise pressure with respect to such issues as enhanced corporate disclosure, public 
accountability and transparency in Tanzania. 
In the above context, therefore, as a socially constructed practice, the nature of CSR 
reporting depends on the outcome of roles played by corporations, the state and 
countervailing structures such as NGOs. However, the extent to which Tanzanian laws and 
regulations and NGO activism have helped to stimulate corporate social disclosure and CSR 
development in Tanzania has remained limited. Despite the enactment of various laws and 
regulations in the name of promoting corporate governance and public accountability, the 
Tanzanian government lacks the necessary financial, legal and administrative resources to 
ensure compliance. Similarly, although NGOs have played an important role in fostering the 
development of CSR in the global economy, it has been difficult for Tanzanian NGOs to 
bring about much-needed changes to CSR practices in Tanzania. Consequently, social and 
                                                 
17LEAT carries out policy research, advocacy and selected public-interest litigation with its members, largely 
lawyers concerned with EM and democratic governance in Tanzania. Other organisations have also been 
campaigning for reform in Tanzania. For example, Norwegian Church Aid (an international organisation formed 
in 2005 by the Norwegian Church to fight global poverty, social and environmental injustices) has been actively 
involved in addressing environmental pollution and degradation in Tanzania, facilitating access to improved, 
affordable and sustainable energy services for the public in both urban and rural areas. It has published several 
reports on the destructive social and environmental actions of TNCs in the mining sector. 
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environmental problems have persisted in Tanzania. This is particularly evident in the mining 
sector, which is considered in the next section. 
 
5. Analysis of empirical evidence 
This section considers some evidence from the Tanzanian mining sector, a sector 
dominated largely by TNCs. It analyses the reporting practices of the two largest gold-mining 
companies and draws attention to the need to demystify the serious social and environmental 
ills often concealed within CSR reports. It argues that, as a developing country, Tanzania’s 
legal and regulatory frameworks and NGO campaigns and advocacy have not been 
sufficiently strong to bring about a positive impact on corporate social and environmental 
practices in the mining sector. In order to develop a deeper understanding of the dynamics of 
CSR reporting in the mining sector, it is necessary first to consider the socio-political, 
economic and regulatory context within which these dynamics occur. 
 
5.1 The Tanzanian mining sector 
Tanzania is endowed with abundant and valuable mineral resources, such as gold, 
coal, copper, silver, mica, nickel, gypsum, and gemstones such as diamonds, tanzanite, 
rubies, sapphires and emeralds, which have potential to stimulate socio-economic 
development (MEM, 2009). The mining sector contributed 3.3 per cent of GDP in 2013, with 
the vast majority of the country’s mineral export revenue coming from gold, accounting for 
89 per cent of the value of these exports in 2013 (Government of Tanzania, 2014). Despite its 
abundant mineral resources, the overall performance of the mining sector remained relatively 
poor for many years following independence, due to a lack of investment capital, 
technological inadequacies and inefficient technical and management expertise (Chachage, 
1995). Owing to this poor performance, in the 1990s the Tanzanian government was 
encouraged by international financial institutions (such as WB and IMF) to reform the sector 
by adopting neo-liberal and deregulatory policies in order to encourage foreign investment 
and to promote the flow of FDI (see UNCTAD, 2007). Following the liberalisation of the 
Tanzanian economy in the 1990s, several multilateral and bilateral agreements were entered 
into in the mining sector (SID, 2009). The Strategy for African Mining technical paper, 
developed by WB and IMF in 1992, played a significant role in transforming the mining 
sector and facilitating the expansion of capital in Tanzania (World Bank, 1992). WB made it 
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very clear in its 1992 study that the role of government was to create a suitable environment 
for private investors. The report claimed that: 
...there was a lack of an attractive enabling environment in developing 
countries for private sector mining investment, a paucity of accurate up-to-date 
geological information and the system to manage the information, inadequate 
or non-existent environment regulation and standards, and insufficient human 
skills and capacity to effectively administer the sector (World Bank, 1992 p. 
53). 
WB asserts the need for regulatory reforms in the mining sector in order to provide a 
more favourable environment for foreign investors. As a result, the regulatory and legal 
frameworks in the mining sector have been shaped largely by the global political economy, 
particularly the neo-liberal development model of WB and IMF (see Cox, 1996). Thus, in 
1997, Tanzania adopted a fiscal regime and a legislative framework that enabled the private 
sector to take a leading role in the exploration, development and extraction of minerals in the 
country. Following the privatisation of the mining sector, the government of Tanzania 
enacted Mining Policy 1997 (amended in 2009) and Mining Act 1998 (amended in 2010), 
which both came into force in July 1999, as well as Mining Regulations 1999, a major act of 
parliament governing the exploration of solid minerals in the mining sector.18 Mining Policy 
1997 and Mining Act 1998 provided a competitive fiscal regime and a legal and regulatory 
framework attractive to foreign investors.19 For example, Mining Policy 1997 offered tax 
reduction incentives and stabilisation clauses, and permitted 100 per cent ownership rights in 
the case of mining investment by transnational mining corporations. Section 10(2) of Mining 
Act 1998 states that the responsible minister must ensure the maintenance of fiscal stability 
for the duration of the project, conformance to the law, and the rates of royalties, taxation, 
customs duty and various fees applicable at the time of signing the agreement. Mining Act 
1998 (amended in 2010) sets out the legal framework governing mineral exploration, 
exploitation and marketing, and empowers the Commissioner for Minerals to regulate all 
mining operations in Tanzania. 
The above neo-liberal reforms increased the inflow of foreign investment into the 
mining sector. For example, between 1996 and 2006, TNCs invested more than US$1.5 
                                                 
18 The mining policy, regulations and act were laid down in order to provide an enabling legal, regulatory, fiscal 
and institutional environment for foreign investors, while enabling the Tanzanian state to introduce 
environmental, health and safety guidelines for mining operations (MEM, 2009). 
19 Mining Policy 1997 played a significant role in transforming the Tanzanian mining sector and integrating it 
into the global market (Christian Aid, 2009). 
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billion, and the contribution of the mining sector to gross domestic product (GDP) increased 
from 3.3 per cent in 2011 to 3.5 per cent in 2012 (Lange, 2006; The Guardian, 2013). 
Inevitably, the negotiation of mineral development agreements between the host state and 
TNCs has created power imbalances between mining companies and the Tanzanian state, and 
a governance gap (see Hilson, 2012). This, in turn, has created dilemmas for the Tanzanian 
state in that its capacity to enact and enforce regulations in order to promote corporate 
accountability, transparency and responsibility is being significantly compromised (see 
Bitala, 2008; Kitula, 2006; Lauwo and Otusanya, 2014). As Harvey (2005) has stressed, in 
encouraging the adoption of neo-liberalism in most key sectors of developing countries, neo-
liberal proponents were of the view that the state and its regulatory framework had to be 
rolled back. Although a number of laws and regulations have been enacted to govern mining 
operations in Tanzania, the desire to create a competitive environment to attract foreign 
investors raises questions about the efficacy of these laws and regulations in promoting some 
aspects of CSR (see Lauwo and Otusanya, 2014; Mwalyosi, 2004). For example, it has been 
argued that stringent stabilisation clauses, which are used by corporate entities to manage 
political and commercial risk, have undermined the Tanzanian government’s power to 
promote important public policies, such as the provision of community healthcare, protection 
of the environment and a satisfactory taxation regime (see Lauwo and Otusanya, 2014). 
Similarly, Lay and Minio-Paluello (2010) have pointed out that stabilisation clauses have the 
effect of immunising investors against future changes in both fiscal and legislative terms: 
Stabilisation clauses reduce legislative sovereignty – removing the ability of 
the country to improve its environmental regulations, laws governing workers’ 
rights or health standards. They allow companies to profit from undeveloped 
regulation and legislation. ... [S]tabilisation clauses are thus detrimental to the 
protection of democracy, environment, human rights and workers’ rights, and 
are an obstacle to development (p. 28). 
 
As a result, transparency, public accountability, good governance and responsible 
mining practices remain an issue for public debate (see Curtis and Lissu, 2008; Lauwo and 
Otusanya, 2014). Thus, despite the government’s efforts to integrate the mining sector into 
the global economy and to attract foreign investment, the impact of mining activities on the 
environment, employees and local communities has been harsh. For example, local 
community members have lost access to natural resources when land use rights have been 
awarded to foreign companies; local water resources have been polluted; and families have 
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been destroyed as the migrant labour system has drawn them apart (see Magubira and 
Nyanje, 2009; Mapalala, 2009; Guardian on Sunday, 2011). 
In recent years, affected local communities have joined forces with civil society 
organisations to campaign against mining activities. Various networks have been established 
to campaign for the monitoring of mining companies, the rehabilitation of damaged resources 
such as water and land, and compensation for mine workers and their communities (see 
Curtis and Lissu, 2008). Increasing numbers of NGOs have been challenging the activities of 
mining companies in Tanzania (see Christian Aid, 2008, 2009; Curtis and Lissu, 2008; SID, 
2009). These companies have allegedly breached human rights and caused pollution and 
environmental degradation (see Christian Aid, 2008, 2009). For example, following 
increasing environmental degradation in mining areas, local and international NGOs have 
expressed concerns about the impact of mining activities, and have warned of the high risk 
that sodium cyanide (a strong poison used to extract gold from ore) may have leaked into 
watercourses and caused health problems for local communities (see Curtis and Lissu, 2008). 
In response to increasing concerns about the harmful social and environmental consequences 
of mining activities, transnational mining companies have published various claims that they 
are conducting their activities in an accountable, transparent and socially responsible way. 
Evidence from the selected case studies is examined in the next section. 
 
5.1.1 CSR reporting practices in the gold-mining sector: Case study analysis 
This section examines the CSR statements of the two largest gold-mining companies 
in Tanzania: Barrick Gold Corporation (2005-2009) and AngloGold Ashanti Limited (2005-
2010). Barrick Gold Corporation (BGC) is a leading international gold-mining company, 
with headquarters in Toronto, Canada and a portfolio of mining and exploration projects in 
the United States, Canada, Australia, Peru, Chile, Argentina and Tanzania. The company is 
listed on the Toronto, New York and London stock exchanges with a market capitalisation of 
about US$37 billion (about Tsh.48.1 trillion). It is now one of the leading private foreign 
companies in the Tanzanian mining sector as a result of its acquisition of four mining sites: 
Bulyanhulu Gold Mine, North Mara Gold Mine, Tulawaka Gold Mine and Buzwagi Gold 
Mine. The company operates both open-pit and underground mining activities, and employs 
over 19,000 Tanzanians (GRAMA, 2001). 
AngloGold Ashanti (AGA) Limited is a global gold producer with headquarters in 
Johannesburg, South Africa. It is listed on the Johannesburg, New York, London, Paris, 
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Brussels, Australian and Ghanaian stock exchanges. In Tanzania, AGA owns Geita Gold 
Mine Limited, which is the largest of the group’s eight open-pit mines in Africa, employing 
over 3,000 Tanzanians (AGA, 2009). 
Table 1 summarises the reports analysed in each of the selected case studies. 
[Insert Table 1] 
Socio-political and economic aspects of Tanzania have been shaping the trajectory of 
its CSR. Thus, as fighting endemic poverty is one of the most important social and economic 
issues in Tanzania, CSR reporting has been predominantly philanthropic in nature. For 
example, BGC has published substantial information on community relations and investment. 
Like other TNCs, in its social responsibility reports from 2005 to 2009, it has stated that it is 
committed to making a positive difference to the communities in which it operates. For 
example, its 2006 annual report stated that it had spent US$275,000 (Tsh.302.5 million) at the 
Bulyanhulu Gold Mine site to support the local Bugarama secondary school, had donated 
US$15,000 (Tshs.16.5 million) to the district council to support a government food relief 
initiative in the district (p. 4), and had spent at least US$186,000 (Tsh.204.6 million) on 
upgrading a clinic in the district (p. 7).20 
Similarly, AGA considers itself to be an integral part of the communities in which it 
operates, a neighbour and key instigator of economic development aimed at improving the 
standard of living of those in the local communities. AGA claims to ensure that communities 
in the mining area are kept informed of and involved in any developments that affect them, 
throughout the lifecycle of the company’s operations. For example, its Social Responsibility 
Report (2005) states: 
Geita Mine liaises with local communities and district authorities in the 
formulation and implementation of development projects and is part of a 
district consultative committee which formulates and co-ordinates the 
implementation of donor-funded projects. The focus is on the key areas of 
health, education, water and economic development (p. 3). 
In responding to NGOs and other pressure groups, as well as global and local 
institutional requirements for environmental management and protection, mining companies 
                                                 
20 Bulyanhulu Gold Mine is one of BGC’s subsidiary companies in Tanzania. The company’s total community 
support to Tanzania in 2006 was reported to be US$321,000 in donations, US$1,110,000 for infrastructural 
development, and US$655,000 for community initiatives and local/regional procurement. 
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in Tanzania also make statements about environmental responsibility in their CSR reports. 
For instance, BGC reports have increasingly emphasised being paid for disclosure on 
environmental matters (from a three-page report in 2004 to a seventeen-page report in 2009), 
and the importance of controlling air emissions at processing plants, such as particulates, 
sulphur dioxide, carbon monoxide and mercury. From 2007 onwards, BGC started to disclose 
information about spillages of hazardous chemicals at mining sites and the fines paid with 
respect to these environmental disasters. For example, BGC (2009, p. 48) disclosed that 9.2 
million litres of processing water had been discharged into the Tigithe River in Tanzania, and 
also that environmental management was a key issue for the company: 
Respect for the environment is at the heart of our management approach to 
environmental protection and stewardship. Barrick’s Corporate Social 
Responsibility Charter drives this approach. The environmental management 
system in place at Bulyanhulu helps us achieve our Charter goals of protection 
and stewardship, and performance indicators help us measure how well we 
have done (BGC, 2009, p. 1). 
Similarly, AGA has claimed that it addresses a wide range of environmental issues in 
Tanzania, for instance pollution control, chemical management, environmental audit, 
resource management, carbon dioxide emissions and environmental incidence reporting. The 
company has stated its commitment to protecting the environment as follows: 
The company is committed to working in an environmentally responsible way, 
recognising that the long-term sustainability of its business is dependent upon 
good stewardships in both the protection of the environment and the efficient 
management of the exploration and extraction of mineral resources (AGA, 
2006, pp. 16-17). 
BGC and AGA acknowledge in their CSR reports that mining activities may have an 
adverse impact on the environment and that they are committed to environmental protection. 
This echoes the regulatory requirement stipulated under sections 38(4)(c) and (d) of Mining 
Act 1998 that: 
Every application for a special mining license must include or be accompanied 
by the applicant’s environmental management plan (EMP), including his 
proposals for the prevention of pollution, waste treatment, protection and 
reclamation of land and water resources and for eliminating or minimizing the 
adverse effects on the environment of the mining operation. 
However, despite the companies’ pledges on environmental responsibility, no specific 
targets on environmental matters are laid down in their reports. Such targets would provide 
evidence of their real commitment to environmental protection and would enable an 
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evaluation of whether they had succeeded in meeting their obligations and responsibilities 
with regard to environmental matters. In other words, these statements seem to focus on 
communicating and disseminating a specific image of environmental responsibility, rather 
than actually doing it in practice (see Banerjee, 2007, 2008). 
In response to the requirements of the ILO and UDHR, as well as the Tanzanian 
Employment and Labour Relations Act 2004 and Labour Institutions Act 2004, with regard to 
employee working conditions, CSR reports by the gold-mining companies also contain 
statements about their professed commitment to promoting employee welfare management. 
These include statements on issues such as health and safety, employee relations, working 
conditions, remuneration and benefits, recruitment practices, training and professional 
development, equal opportunities and non-discrimination. For example, AGA (2008) has 
reported that: 
We place people first and correspondingly put the highest priority on safe and 
healthy practices and systems of work. We are responsible for seeking out new 
and innovative ways to ensure that our workplaces are free of occupational 
injury and illness. We live each day for each other and use our collective 
commitment, talents, resource and systems to deliver on our most important 
commitment to care (p.14). 
Similarly, BGC’s Bulyanhulu Gold Mine Social Responsibility Report (2009) stated 
its commitment to promoting the health and safety of its employees: 
We are committed to eliminating and/or controlling all workplace hazards for 
the protection of our workers. We believe that everyone is responsible for 
workplace safety. Health and safety training programs are in place for 
managers, employees and contractors at Bulyanhulu. These programs provide 
all employees and contractors with a clear understanding of their rights, 
responsibilities and accountabilities in creating and maintaining a safe 
workplace for all (p. 4). 
Although CSR reporting in Tanzania’s gold-mining sector has been increasing in 
recent years, the information disclosed has remained somewhat selective and at the discretion 
of management. This selectiveness of information disclosure in CSR reports is consistent 
with earlier studies that have found disclosure to be dependent on management discretion, 
with support for social responsibility initiatives provided purely for business reasons, rather 
than for any altruistic desire to improve conditions in the workplace or in local communities 
(see e.g. Sikka, 2010; Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2007). Indeed, corporate rationality has 
continued to dictate the nature and acceptable scope of CSR (see Banerjee, 2008, p. 61). The 
31 
countless scandals involving large transnational companies in this industry are indicative of 
the persistent and significant gap between CSR discourses and practice (see Hilson et al., 
2007; Fonseca, 2010; Kitula, 2006). Thus, despite legal requirements regarding social and 
environmental accounting, pressure group activity and increasing corporate disclosure on 
social and environmental responsibility, the evidence indicates that the reality is otherwise 
(see Curtis and Lissu, 2008; Christian Aid, 2008, 2009; Lauwo and Otusanya, 2014; SID, 
2009). This is discussed in further detail in the next section. 
 
5.1.2 Demystifying CSR reporting practices in the Tanzanian gold-mining sector 
Campbell (2012) has argued that the myriad of regulatory reforms that WB has 
promoted through privatisation and liberalisation in the African mining sector have had 
disappointing results with regard to the capacity of mining activities to contribute to socio-
economic development and reducing environmental impact. With growing concern over the 
impact of mining activities, mining companies in Tanzania have in recent years increased 
their CSR disclosures. However, the degree to which they actually implement CSR principles 
in their on-the-ground operations remains questionable (see Hilson et al., 2007; Fonseca, 
2010; Lauwo and Otusanya, 2014; Slack, 2012). As Slack (2012, p. 181) argues, through 
their CSR disclosures, mining companies often promise direct and indirect benefits to 
stakeholders such as employees, the local community and the government, but these promises 
often fail to materialise. A similar situation is observed in Tanzania, where the evidence 
shows that, contrary to the mining companies’ claims regarding CSR, the negative socio-
economic and environmental impact of mining activities has intensified considerably over the 
years (Bitala, 2008; Bitala et al., 2009; Christian Aid, 2008, 2009; Mnyanyika, 2009; Curtis 
and Lissu, 2008; Mapalala, 2009; Shekighenda, 2009; Guardian on Sunday, 2011; Lauwo 
and Otusanya, 2014; SID, 2009). In the context of increasing social and environmental 
problems, mining companies have been facing serious opposition from environmentalist 
NGOs, religious organisations, the media and local residents around the mining sites (see 
Curtis and Lissu, 2008; Kitula, 2006; Lauwo and Otusanya, 2014). 
For example, one active NGO, LEAT, has been collaborating with international 
NGOs and religious organisations in Tanzania to campaign against the prevalence of 
pollution and environmental degradation, dislocation and social unrest in local communities, 
and employee grievances in mining areas. LEAT has also been working closely with other 
NGOs to campaign for a share of mining profits to go directly to affected local communities, 
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including small-scale artisanal miners who were formerly landlords of mining sites but were 
evicted to make way for the foreign mining companies. In an interview with BBC London, a 
representative of LEAT noted: ‘it is obvious this investment in the mining sector is not of 
benefit to Tanzanian citizens, it rather transfers the country’s resources outside’ (Dean, 
2001). Similarly, Lauwo and Otusanya (2014) argue that the presence of six large-scale gold-
mining operations in Tanzania, increases in gold production and a boom in gold prices on the 
world market are yet to be translated into significant socio-economic benefits for the 
Tanzanian population as a whole. 
Several scholars have attempted to show how neo-liberal ideologies have facilitated 
the expansion of capital but at the same time have created a number of challenges with regard 
to regulatory policies in developing countries, as well as serious social problems (see Vogel, 
1996). For example, McSweeney (2009, p. 838) posits that ‘the current financial market crisis 
has resulted from hollowing-out of regulatory constraints and the domination of corporate 
governance policies by the notion of maximising shareholder value’. Thus, although legal 
provisions in Tanzania (such as NEP 1997 and EM 1984) require mining companies to 
control pollution and to deal with the environmental impact of their activities, pollution and 
environmental degradation caused by mining have remained prevalent and have arguably 
created serious health risks for local communities (see Curtis and Lissu, 2008; Kitula, 2006; 
Lauwo and Otusanya, 2014). For instance, it was reported that total carbon dioxide emissions 
increased from 2.3 metric carbon tonnes in 1999 to 4.3 metric carbon tonnes in 2004 (UNDP, 
2010). Similarly to Tanzania, Belal and Roberts (2010) have highlighted how policies and 
rules for regulating the environmental behaviour of companies in Bangladesh have been weak 
and ineffective and have allowed environmental degradation to persist: 
...in reality these [policies and regulations] are routinely flouted due to lack of 
enforcement by the relevance agencies which appear to be corrupt, weak and 
ineffective. They also lack strong political will and necessary resources ... to be 
able to implement the relevant laws (p. 313). 
Our interviews conducted with representatives of NGOs and local community 
members also highlighted mixed concerns regarding the disappointing impacts of mining 
activities in Tanzania. The local residents interviewed expressed some concern about how 
government regulatory controls have failed to mitigate the environmental consequences of 
mining activities in local communities. The interviewees were of the opinion that regulations 
are not enforced in Tanzania. One community leader mentioned that very little effort had 
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been made by the government to investigate and control the effects of mining on the 
surrounding communities, such as environmental pollution. He explained: 
“Mining activities have an environmental impact, yet we are not sure of its 
extent for our environment. We are not being informed by the government 
whether the water is still safe or has been polluted. We live near the [location 
of the] mining. The company has a responsibility but I think government has 
more roles to play than the company. Our government policies protect the 
investors rather than taking care of its citizens” (COMLedGP1). 
 
A village leader (COMLedG1) added that most local residents depended on natural 
water sources, such as streams, river and wells, for their daily water supply, but that these 
water sources had been considerably contaminated by the toxic chemicals used in the mining 
industry’s extraction and processing. LEAT and religious organisations have warned of the 
possible health risks caused by pollution, and the environmental effects of mining activities, 
and have called for companies’ utmost commitment and precautions regarding possible 
environmental hazards (see Bitala, 2008; Tanzania Daily News, 2012). It can be inferred from 
the interviews that environmental pollution and its associated health risks have been made 
possible by lack of enforcement of environmental regulations. This underlines the dynamics 
faced by the Tanzanian government resulting from the neo-liberal reforms, which have led to 
power imbalances in terms of expected outcomes for the mining companies, for the state and 
also, crucially, for the local population. This lack of enforcement of environmental laws has 
been identified in many developing countries (Belal et al., 2015; Hilson, 2012). 
Our interviewees also expressed their views on working conditions and employment 
relations. Contrary to the mining companies’ claims that they maintain and promote equal 
opportunity policies and provide much-needed employment for Tanzanian citizens, the 
employee representatives interviewed in this study were concerned about poor working 
conditions in the mining sites. The interviewees were also critical of the legal and regulatory 
framework governing the mining industry and mining activity. The poor checking mechanism 
in the mining sector was illustrated by one employee: 
“Despite the companies’ claims to be complying with local rules and 
regulations, no regular monitoring on the part of the government has been 
done to substantiate the companies’ claims about compliance. Who is 
responsible for ensuring that the companies’ implementation complies with all 
the labour laws in Tanzania? Who is checking whether the companies are 
implementing what has been stipulated by the law?” (EMP G1) 
 
Another employee representative added: 
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“There is a need for a review of the institutions and regulations in Tanzania to 
reflect the nature of and the risk involved in the mining sector. Companies 
utilise the weaknesses in our regulations as a loophole, as they work towards 
maximising their profits. For example, mineral development agreements 
(MDAs) rarely specify what is expected from companies in relation to 
employee welfare” (EMP GI). 
 
Another employee stated: 
“Despite companies’ efforts on compliance with local rules and regulations in 
Tanzania, still there are a number of problems in the workplace. For example, 
health-wise, when you go to the underground mining area, the area is very 
smoky and unsafe, and there are not enough air and ventilation systems. The 
company pressure to meet production targets and [ensure] turnover 
maximisation often jeopardises health and safety issues. People are forced to 
work in some unbearable working conditions” (EMP Bu1). 
 
Consistent with the political economy perspective, a governance gap was highlighted 
by interviewees as a principle cause of the disappointing impact of mining activities in 
Tanzania (see Campbell, 2012). Indeed, in light of the dynamics of the implementation of 
neo-liberal policies, the Tanzanian state has had to compromise some of its regulatory 
controls to persuade TNCs to invest in the mining sector. Thus, pressure on the Tanzanian 
state to compete for foreign investment may require the imposition of less rigorous laws and 
regulations; and such strategies may constrain its ability to control working conditions for 
workers, and living conditions for the local population in mining areas. 
Relationships between the mining companies and those living near mining areas have 
also been a matter for debate amongst NGOs in Tanzania (see Bitala et al., 2009). In order to 
empower local communities, the Mineral Policy of Tanzania 1997 contains provisions 
requiring mining companies to strengthen their relationships with local communities. 
However, despite these legal requirements, and the companies’ claims regarding their 
community investments, the interviews conducted for this study revealed concern about 
displacement and social dislocation in these local communities. The local residents 
interviewed (COMLedG1 and COMLedGP1) were sceptical of the corporate promises made 
to local communities about addressing the widespread poverty in local villages. The 
interviewees were of the view that corporate social initiatives had often been used for public 
relations purposes. One local resident stated: 
“The mining companies’ interaction with the local community is poor; they 
make promises which they never fulfil. To be accountable to the local 
community, companies should support local procurement at the community 
level instead of importing most of their consumables from outside the country. 
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For example, they import food products such as meat, vegetables, rice, 
chicken, which can be found locally. Small tenders should prioritise the local 
people; training should be provided for the local people” (COMmeBu1). 
 
The interviewees were highly critical of the mining regulations, in particular 
enforcement of the compensation provisions set out in the Land Act 1999 and the Mining Act 
1998. Section 96 of the Mining Act 1998 states that a mining prospecting licence shall be 
utilised without causing any harm to the land owner or the rightful resident. Section 96(3) 
also states that compensation for the resident should match the market value, and be true and 
sufficient. In contrast, the interviewees were of the view that mining companies often fail to 
adhere to their legal responsibility regarding community relations in Tanzania. As one local 
community member pointed out: 
“Contrary to the Tanzania Land and Village Act – which stipulates the basis of 
compensation for relocation – the compensation rates used remained very low 
and outdated. For example, one villager owning a block house and a farm very 
close to one mine site was offered US$3,300 (Tsh.4 million) as compensation 
by [a named company] should he agree to relocate... As the named villager 
disputed the amount of compensation and refused to relocate, he is still living 
(with his family) inside the mine buffer zone” (COMmeNM1). 
 
Although section 96(5) of the Mining Act 1998 states that, in the case of any dispute 
relating to the compensation paid under section 96(3), the complainant may submit a 
complaint to the Commissioner of Minerals, the government has been taking a long time to 
address local community concerns (see Curtis and Lissu, 2008). The Mineral Policy of 
Tanzania 1997 also requires the payment of compensation, but payment is left to the 
discretion of individual companies. Thus, the Tanzanian state’s desire to enforce regulations 
is weak as it fears that, by imposing stringent regulations, TNCs might relocate to another 
host state offering a more attractive investment environment (see Hilson, 2012; Campbell, 
2012). 
NGOs, the media and local residents have expressed concerns over the ongoing social 
unrest and unresolved conflicts resulting from the forceful eviction from their mining area of 
local people who previously owned land and mining rights, and the unfair or non-existent 
amounts of compensation awarded for their displacement. For example, in a controversial 
case against Barrick Gold Corporation, LEAT, the active local NGO in Tanzania, represented 
a group of small-scale miners who had been forcefully evicted from their land to make way 
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for foreign companies.21 However, the LEAT team lost the case, and the majority of the 
evicted villagers who had previously depended on mining activities ended up with no homes 
or alternatives for generating an income (also Magubira and Nyanje, 2009). In summary, 
LEAT has not been strong enough to fight powerful TNCs in the sector and campaign for 
vulnerable local people in mining areas. In fact, displaced locals who have been unable to 
regain meaningful livelihoods are bitter and view the discovery of gold and the coming of 
large-scale investors as a curse rather than a blessing. The bitterness and anger of the 
displaced is reflected in ongoing conflicts between local communities and mining companies 
(Magubira and Nyanje, 2009). 
Thus, although the gold-mining companies claim in their CSR reports that they 
maintain good relations with, and make a significant contribution to, local communities, there 
is in fact little disclosure relating to ongoing social unrest and grievances in these 
communities. Moreover, the serious environmental consequences of gold mining, the 
evictions of local communities and the human rights abuses of local people carried out by the 
mining companies are rarely disclosed in their CSR reports. The increasing evidence of 
environmental pollution and degradation, destruction of local communities, poor working 
conditions and discrimination in the workplace raises serious questions about the 
effectiveness of the regulatory frameworks, as well as the role played by NGOs and other 
pressure groups in Tanzania. In the above context, the legal and regulatory frameworks 
governing gold mining in Tanzania have been weak, and there has been inadequate 
enforcement of obligations on TNCs to create structures for improving social and 
environmental performance and CSR disclosure (see Curtis and Lissu, 2008; Lauwo and 
Otusanya; 2014). Also, the absence of empowered stakeholders, such as pressure groups 
interested in promoting CSR and corporate governance, means that CSR has remained 
relatively weak in Tanzania. 
 
                                                 
21 In August 1996, the government of Tanzania ordered the eviction of a community of small-scale miners from 
their homes and worksites in the Bulyanhulu gold fields to allow a Canadian mining company, Sutton 
Resources, to take over the site. The mine was acquired by Canadian-owned Barrick Gold Corporation three 
years later. No compensation was paid to the people – estimated to number between 30,000 and 400,000 – who 
were forcefully removed from the area (MiningWatch Canada, 2002). 
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6. Summary and Conclusions 
This paper has demonstrated the importance of adequately regulating social, 
environmental, labour and human rights issues, and the huge difficulties faced by a 
developing country, namely Tanzania, in seeking to implement regulatory forms that are 
acceptable to the TNCs involved and to the wider political and economic interests they 
represent. The evidence of this paper reveals that, despite gold-mining companies’ initiatives 
to increase their social and environmental disclosures, such reporting has remained selective, 
and a business-as-usual attitude prevails. The increasing evidence of social and 
environmental problems in the Tanzanian mining sector raises questions about the adequacy 
and effectiveness of the legislative and regulatory frameworks, as well as the role played by 
pressure groups, and NGOs in particular. The persistence of socio-economic and 
environmental problems in the Tanzanian mining sector points to a neo-liberal crisis at both 
global and local levels (see Campbell, 2012). This is attributable to the implementation of 
neo-liberal economic policies in the Tanzanian mining sector that have not only created 
oligopolies in the sector but have also imposed constraints on government regulatory 
capability. 
It has been argued that, for CSR to be effective, regardless of the location, there must 
be a foundation of robust regulations and enforcement, complemented by strong political 
pressure (see Hilson, 2012). However, this paper suggests that the drive to legislate and 
enforce regulations in Tanzania is lacking. While political pressure from NGO campaigns 
and advocacy has problematised the declining role of the state and has started to address the 
governance gap created in the globalising era (Neu et al., 1998; Unerman and O’Dwyer, 
2007), the outcomes have not yet been as successful in developing countries in general, and 
Tanzania in particular. Indeed, government regulatory frameworks and NGO activism in 
many developing countries such as Tanzania are arguably embedded within the neo-liberal 
economic logic of the global capitalist system (see Harvey, 2005, 2007). In this context, this 
paper has suggested that CSR in a developing country such as Tanzania needs to be 
understood from a political economy perspective in order to show how the interplays of ‘free 
market’ neo-liberalist philosophy have not only created asymmetrical and unequal power 
relations between the host state and TNCs, but also regulatory battles. 
This paper therefore makes theoretical and empirical contributions. Theoretically, we 
further the literature on the political economy of social accounting disclosure (see e.g. Belal 
and Cooper, 2011; Banerjee, 2007; Cooper and Sherer, 1984; Guthrie and Parker, 1990; 
Kuasirikun and Sherer, 2004; Tinker et al., 1991) by showing how interrelationships between 
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socio-political, historical and economic structures have shaped the nature of CSR discourse in 
the Tanzanian mining sector. We have drawn attention to the dynamics of neo-liberal 
agreements entered into in the Tanzanian mining sector which have created asymmetries in 
bargaining position and power between TNCs, the state, NGOs and other social actors. In 
fact, these in-built power asymmetries are inevitable and are unlikely to be dismantled easily 
or quickly (see Harvey, 2007). Thus, political economy theory has helped to re-frame key 
issues in our research and has made visible to political economic analysis the potentially 
strategic significance of focusing on a form of leverage-grounded interplay between 
accounting numbers and the formation of specific regulatory initiatives. 
Empirically, we contribute to the literature on accountability, governance, 
transparency and CSR by providing some insights from the Tanzanian gold-mining context to 
show how CSR reporting is an outcome of roles played by corporations, the host state and 
other countervailing forces such as NGOs. This has revealed how accounting as a social 
practice is not simply located within a context bounded by corporate or state-led initiatives, 
but also operates across a context that includes local populations. While this paper has 
addressed ethical, accountability, transparency and responsibility issues which may be of 
relevance in many social settings, the focus has been on the Tanzanian socio-political, 
economic and regulatory context, seeking to stimulate new ideas for research aimed at 
broadening the understanding of CSR in the context of the mining industry in developing 
countries (see Campbell, 2012; Fonseca, 2010; Garvin et al., 2009; Hilson, 2012), and, in 
light of the many challenges faced, work that helps to inform policy making. 
This paper calls for radical regulatory and institutional reforms, but recognises that 
any attempt to reform governance structures at the domestic level will require the Tanzanian 
government to be more proactive. In particular, stronger enforcement mechanisms need to be 
put in place to ensure that mining companies and other TNCs in Tanzania discharge their 
obligations to local citizens. However, the difficulty for Tanzania is that the government 
needs to attract foreign investment to stimulate the economy and deal with endemic poverty. 
As has been shown, it has offered various guarantees, protections and stabilisation clauses as 
incentives to encourage TNCs to invest in the country, but in doing so it has lost the ability to 
put in place suitably workable regulatory controls, for instance with regard to the 
environment, health and safety at work, and the protection of human rights. Thus, the need to 
attract foreign investment makes it difficult for the Tanzanian government to demand 
corporate disclosure and to promote the welfare of its citizens with regard to controlling and 
eradicating unethical corporate social practices. If the Tanzanian government were to impose 
39 
more stringent requirements on companies to ensure they conducted their business in a 
socially responsible way, such as by giving greater consideration to environmental and 
human rights concerns, companies might decide not to invest in Tanzania, which would in 
turn have a detrimental impact on the socio-economic development of the country. However, 
it is to be hoped that such difficulties can be resolved in the future, for example by raising the 
general level of knowledge and education on mining activities within the local population. 
The Tanzanian government could thereby simultaneously promote local investment in the 
sector, thus helping to eradicate the abject poverty suffered by large numbers of Tanzanian 
citizens. 
This paper also calls for the empowerment of NGOs and other civil society 
organisations through educational, capacity-building, technological and other support, to 
enable them to play a greater role in advocacy and campaigns for transparency, accountability 
and corporate governance changes (see O’Dwyer et al., 2003). NGOs, the media and 
academics should work together to lobby for mandatory regulations on corporate social 
disclosure, in particular disclosure of the effect of corporate activities on local communities. 
Furthermore, NGOs and other pressure groups can play a pivotal role by criticising and 
challenging governance structures and by producing counter-accounts of corporate activities 
in order to bring issues and problems to public attention. We recognise that the above 
proposals may not be straightforward, given the existing power asymmetries in the global 
economy and the financial dilemma facing many types of NGO; however, addressing the 
issue of improving regulations through some form of third-party approach would at least 
challenge current political/economic settings, in which first-world corporations and political 
interests confront individual developing countries with a ‘take it or leave it’ regulatory 
framework that systematically constrains the possibility of effective environmental, human 
and labour rights regulations in the host country. 
With regard to future research, there is potential for considering some social 
accounting issues within a wider political arena, especially the dynamics caused by the gap 
between idealism and pragmatism in CSR practice. Future research should further consider 
the social and environmental issues relating to CSR practices, and the broader institutional 
dynamics, as well as different types of civil society groups, for instance the role played by 
trade unions and the media. More research is needed to examine the challenges faced by 
NGOs and other pressure groups in engaging with the issue of corporate social accountability 
in developing countries. Research is also needed to examine how NGOs themselves develop 
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their conceptions of the social needs and expectations of the individuals they purport to 
represent. 
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Table 1: Summary of reports analysed in the selected case studies 
Report analysed and key categories Barrick Gold 
Corporation 
AngloGold 
Ashanti Limited 
Annual reports: 
- Community initiatives 
- Employee salaries and contribution 
- Environmental management  
2006 – 
Social responsibility reports:  
- Environmental management 
- Employees’ welfare management 
- Community initiatives 
2005, 2006, 2007, 
2009 
2004, 2005, 2006, 
2008, 2009 
Corporate website: 
- Environmental management 
- Employees’ welfare management 
- Community initiatives 
√ √ 
 
